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Idealizing Reduction: The Microfoundations of Macroeconomics
I. Microfoundations
Economics, since the publication of John Maynard Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money in 1936 , has been selfconsciously divided into two main branches: microeconomics and macroeconomics. The question of the relationship between the two branches was raised immediately -by Keynes himself, by his critics and by his acolytes (e.g., Keynes 1936 , chs. 11 and 13; Leontieff 1936; Klein 1947 .
Nonetheless, until the early 1970s, a degree of autonomy was widely accepted for each of the two branches. With the rise of the new classical macroeconomics in the mid1970s, a more radical position began to dominate economics: macroeconomic analysis could be regarded as wellgrounded, secure, or reliable only to the extent that it could be appropriately connected to microeconomic analysis (Hoover 1988) . Macroeconomics is widely regarded today as standing in need of microfoundations and, indeed, as not being a coequal branch of economics, rather as a derivative and, perhaps, even dispensable mode of economic analysis. The necessity -indeed, even the possibility of microfoundations -has been challenged in a number of different ways. 1 In this paper, I
want to examine the defense offered to one such challenge -namely, the construction of the representativeagent model, the most popular approach to microfoundations, as an idealization of a complete generalequilibrium model of the economy.
Microeconomics is the economics of the behavior of individual economic agents.
Typically, microeconomic models or explanations derive the behavior of an economic agent (typically a person, household, or firm) through the optimization of an objective 2 function subject to constraints. An agent is modeled as a set of ordered preferences over combinations of consumption goods (where "goods" is interpreted broadly and might, for example, include items not typically traded such as leisure, risk, or prestige). Available combinations of goods are restricted by a budget. Behavior is modeled as the choice of the most preferred attainable combination of goods. Similarly, a firm is typically modeled as maximizing profits subject to the constraints of the available technology.
Microeconomic analysis that treats individuals as optimizing within a wider context that is fixed so that there is no feedback from the choice of the individual to the economy as a whole is called partial equilibrium Partial equilibrium is frequently justified on the assumption that the individual is small relative to the whole, so that feedbacks are negligible. Microeconomics that considers the complete set of interactions that makes up an economy is called general equilibrium. It is still a type of microeconomics, even though there is a sense in which it treats the economy as a whole, since the individual agent remains the driver and there is no place for aggregates.
Macroeconomics addresses the economy as a whole, focusing on the behavior of economic of aggregates, such as gross domestic product (GDP), employment, unemployment, inflation, and interest rates.
At least three distinct theses -with different methodological implications -march under the microfoundational banner: Thesis 3 is the dominant view in economics today. Sometimes it is regarded aspirationally: good macroeconomics should strive for microfoundations in this sense, though it might not be possible to achieve at present, so that pragmatically we might temporarily have to do with something less satisfactory (see Blanchard and Fischer 1989, ch. 2 and , surprisingly, Lucas 2004) . Frequently, Thesis 3 is held aggressively.
Some reductions aim to explain the success of one theory or one level of explanation by means of a more fundamental theory but not to eliminate the reduced theory from the practitioner's toolkit. For example, those who believe that the ideal gas laws reduce to statistical mechanics do not claim that the ideal gas laws should be abandoned for practical purposes. In contrast, the advocates of Thesis 3 hold that the only acceptable or useful macroeconomics is microfoundational. 2 Thesis 3 seeks the ultimate euthanasia of macroeconomics: there is no higher level macroeconomic theory worth preserving for a lower level microecononomic theory to explain.
The appeal of Thesis 3 is partly the result of the conception that most economists hold of what the discipline of economics is. The most popular definition of economics, due to Lionel Robbins (1935, p. 16) , sees economics as "the science which studies human 4 behavior as a relationship between scarce means which have alternative uses." Such a definition comes close to saying, "if it is not microeconomics, it is not economics."
More salient perhaps is Robert Lucas's (1976) famous "critique" of econometric policy evaluation. Lucas argued that macroeconometric models -that is, statistically estimated models of the relationships of macroeconomic aggregates -were not identified in the sense that they captured correlations among the data but not the causal structure that generates them. Failure of identification renders such models useless for conditional prediction and, therefore, for policy analysis. Lucas argued that policymakers adopt rules. To the degree that individuals understand these rules, they incorporate them into their own choices. If the rules change, the choices change, and the implied relationships among variables that aggregate those choices also change.
One lesson of the Lucas critique is that conditional inference requires an appropriately causally articulated model. Another lesson is that an appropriate model must capture the intentional actions of economic agents. The fundamental explanatory trope of microeconomics is that ought implies is. Economics on this view is intentional; it must capture the beliefs, expectations, and choices of individual agents.
Macroecononomics without microfoundations will fail to do so.
The majority of macroeconomists accept some sort of microfoundational thesis. 
II. Implementing Reduction
The most popular way of implementing the reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics is the representativeagent strategy: a single agent or limited number of agents (typical of types or categories of agents), who follow microeconomic rules, stands for the whole economy.
The most straightforward difficulty with representativeagent models is that they typically adopt functional forms for the preferences of the representative agent that directly mimic the forms that microeconomists have found most useful in describing the behavior of individuals. Yet, it is well known that perfect aggregation -the situation in which aggregates behave as scaled up versions of microeconomic quantities -is possible only under conditions that are certainly never realized (Gorman 1953 , Hoover 2001a 3 In fact, third, the decentralization of the social planner problem is typically itself carried out only in a representative manner (see, for example, Blanchard and Fischer 1989, ch. 2) . The Leviathan's optimization is shown to be equivalent to an optimization problem with aggregate prices, wages, and interest rates, as if there were markets for GDP, aggregate labor, and aggregate money rather than markets for golf balls, accountants, and particular withdrawals from ATM machines. Finally, to further complicate the problem, the theorem on which the whole strategy rests requires that the conditions of perfect competition be fulfilled. Any market imperfection renders the second theorem of welfare economics false.
Stripped of the support of the decentralization theorem, the representativeagent strategy amounts to the assertion that reduction has been achieved when we posit an agent whose utility derives from various macroeconomic aggregates and who takes national income as his budget. Yet, there are no individual agents and no individual commodities in the model. Rhetoric aside, the model mimics the mathematics of microeconomics without employing its substance.
It is easy to lampoon the representativeagent strategy: it is analogous to providing a reduction of the gas laws to mechanics by modeling a single molecule scaled up to room size (Hoover 2001a, ch. 3) . Nevertheless, it is related to a more defensible strategy, which I discuss in detail in Section IV: idealized reduction.
Idealized reduction is more defensible in that it connects the macro to the micro through clear idealizing steps and provides scope for improving the idealization in the 8 sense of progressively relaxing the idealizing assumptions. While I believe that it does not ultimately succeed in providing eliminative microfoundations for macroeconomics, there is a case to answer. Before investigating that case, let us consider idealization more generally.
III. Formal and Substantive Idealization
FORMAL IDEALIZATION
One account of idealization in science is found, for example, in the work Leszek Nowak (1980) . 4 Let G(x) be a complete theory and F(x) and idealized theory; and let
. . ., n, denote primary factors and p j , j = 1, 2, . . ., k, denote secondary factors. Then, then a complete theory is idealized by setting secondary factors to their limits (0 or ¥, but represented without loss of generality as p j = 0). Thus, the relationship between the idealization and the complete theory is given by, (4) if G(x) and p 1 (x) = 0 and p 2 (x) = 0 and . . . p k1 (x) = 0 and p k (x) = 0, then
For example, if G(x) is the complete theory of planetary motion governed by Newton's laws, then one of the p j (x) = 0 might state that the diameters of the planets are zero; while their masses would be among the factors indicated by the H i (x).
The idealized theory can be improved in the sense of being brought closer to a full description of reality by progressive concretization. Each concretizing step amounts to eliminating one of the limit conditions represented in the setting aside of secondary factors (p z (x) = 0) and adding a related primary factor (H z (x)) to the idealized theory with appropriate changes to the function (f ) to yield a less idealized theory (F¢(x)):
and p 1 (x) = 0 and p 2 (x) = 0 and . . . p z1 (x) = 0 and p z (x) ¹ 0 and p z+1 (x) = 0 . . .
There are then sequences of theories, each less idealized than the last. Progress through such sequences is a process of successive concretization that terminates in the recovery of the full theory.
If such a formal idealization is to do any work in science, the distinction between primary and secondary factors needs to be fleshed out and some sort of coherence requirement needs to be placed on the idealized theory. Otherwise, the exercise is easily trivialized. Formally, we could simple switch the roles of primary and secondary factors, and could still recover the full theory through successive concretization. By a coherence requirement, I mean that there must be a sense in which the work that can be done by the idealized theory is similar to that done by the complete theory. For example, computations using the idealized theory of planetary motion are able to predict to some desired level of approximation the observed orbital paths even if, because of idealization, they have nothing whatever to say about tides or wobbles of the planetary axes. Without such a requirement, any set of propositions that could be written in the nested structure of (4) would count as an idealization, even if it lacked all explanatory power. There is a sense in which the idealization must, to use Plato's metaphor, take the world apart a the joints. The idealization must get to the essence of the matter. One advantage of the formal analysis is that it suggests that there may be more than one way to idealize, more Formal accounts of idealization imply that the complete theory (G(x)) is known, so that idealization is a matter of the setting side of known secondary factors. Such a 10 conception is impractical: frequently, we do not know -except perhaps in a broad brush
way -exactly what we are idealizing away. In practice, idealization is less a matter of subtracting away considerations from a complete theory than of building up a simplified model.
The terms "theory" and "model" are fraught (see for example, Hausman's 1992, ch. 5, discussion in relation to economics). Without trying to resolve the issue of how best to use these terms, I have so far adopted what I believe to be the vernacular among economists. "Theories" in this usage are more abstract; "models" are concrete and instantiate general theoretical lessons in particular forms for particular pragmatic purposes. Models are tools for reasoning. Most models provide practical algorithms for deriving concrete conclusions or rules for manipulation and heuristics for drawing analogies between the model and modeled phenomena.
On this view, models are not idealizations, though they may in some sense participate in idealizations. For some purposes an ideal triangle is a polygon with three straight sides setting aside any reference to its particular angles or the lengths of its sides.
Such an idealized triangle may figure in geometric proofs. But a model of a triangle (for example, a diagram or a manipulable object) cannot be ideal in the same way. It will be imperfect; its sides for example, not being straight except within some limits of approximation. And it will be particular: it must have definite angles and lengths of sides. Such a model functions as an idealization only under some selfdenying ordinances or interpretive protocols that eschew conclusions that depend on the particular, nonideal features.
3.2 SUBSTANTIVE IDEALIZATION
The relationship between the model triangle and the ideal triangle suggests another form of idealization that we might call substantive idealization. Galilean idealizations are substantive in that they amount to isolating causal mechanisms from disturbing casual influences to exhibit their operation in a pure form (McMullin 1985; Cartwright 1989 ). Sometimes such isolations are understood theoretically so that they are closely analogous to the formal idealizing steps of Nowak's formulation (4). But sometimes we know only phenomenal, not theoretical, relationships, which are used instrumentally to eliminate causal disturbances. Other times we appeal to general strategies of isolation such as shielding or randomization that we believe will eliminate a range of nonspecific disturbances. At all times, we simply hope that our substantive idealizations have not left out any important, but unknown, disturbing factor.
Where formal idealizations are qualitative and abstract, the promise of substantive idealizations is that they might be quantified and engaged with concrete situations (e.g., experiments) or models. Substantive idealization is correlative to approximation. A substantively idealized model is successful if it fits the data or predicts, or meets some other measure of differential empirical success, well enough within some acceptable limits of approximation, provided that its success is traceable to -that is, depends essentially on -the model. The idealization of the distance of fall of a dense sphere according to Newton's laws as distance = ½´ g´time 2 is successful if, up to the limits of approximation we care about, it fits the data as well as a less idealized relationship that, say, took account of air resistance and if the successful fit would not have been 12 achieved through an alternative characterization, say, a linear one such as distance = ½ ´ g ´ time.
The notion of dependency is essentially fuzzy, since there are variations in the relationship that will be indistinguishable within any particular limits of approximation.
Yet, such a distinction is needed with respect to substantive idealization for the same reason that the distinction between primary and secondary factors was needed in
Nowak's account of formal idealization. Historically, rational economic man was regarded not as a true description, but as an idealization. Mill, Jevons, and Marshall all recognized a hierarchy of human motives or values, of which they saw the economic as being the lowest, but also the broadest and most pervasive. While they did not use the terminology of idealization, they nevertheless saw constrainedoptimization as a substantive idealization. It captured a real tendency in human behavior, which dominated but did not completely determine, certain individual and social outcomes. Reasoning based on such a pervasive motive was, therefore, a good enough approximation for many purposes and many circumstances.
IV. The Idealized Reduction of Macroeconomics to Microeconomics
MICROECONOMICS IDEALIZATIONS
The centrality of the constrainedoptimization idealization explains the persistent urge to discover the microfoundations of macroeconomics. Blanchard and Fischer (1989, ch. 8) provides a nice exemplar of a microfoundational reduction of macroeconomics. In the 14 interest of pedagogical clarity, their account is schematic, omitting many details that may be repaired in obvious ways.
Blanchard and Fischer's reduction also calls on idealizations of a higher orderthat is, ones that apply within microeconomics qua microeconomics and are not particular to the reduction of macroeconomics to microeconomics. The primary such idealization is the form of competition, which is treated in nearly every microeconomics textbook. Consider the sole producer of a good (a monopolist). The monopolist faces the entire market demand and to maximize profits chooses a price or a quantity to produce (one implies the other as a function of demand) that balances the increase in net revenue per unit as prices rise against the fall in the number of units sold. If we consider two or more producers (duopoly or oligopoly) of the same type of good, we introduce the problem of their interaction -the optimal behavior of each depends on the choices of the others. To reach any definitive conclusion, some assumption about how producers behave in oligopolistic situations is introduced.
The most common assumption derives from Cournot (1838 Cournot ( [1929 ): each producer takes the other producers' quantity decisions as fixed and unaffected by its own choice; it then chooses the quantity that maximizes profits. An equilibrium occurs when each firms' best response is to maintain its current response and every firm charges the same price. Each firm's optimization problem can be described as a reaction function of their quantities to a common market price.
Cournot's assumption or other alternative should not be regarded as idealizations in Nowak's sense. Rather they are particular, nonideal features similar to the particular angles that must be incorporated into a manipulable model triangle. Once in place, however, they may help sustain idealization. Take the Cournot oligopoly solution as a starting point and let the number of identical producers of identical goods (n) rise without limit (n ® ¥). Producers are then seen as infinite in number and infinitely small relative to the market. Unlike the monopolist at the n = 1 extreme, their quantity decisions do not individually affect price, so they simply take prices as given by the market and give their best quantity response. This is clearly a Nowakian idealization in which market power (the ability to affect the demand for one's own product) is idealized away by taking the number or firms to an extreme limit. Market prices themselves "emerge" from the interaction of these highly disaggregated producers' reaction functions, which aggregate to market supply, and the similarly highly disaggregated consumers' reaction functions, which aggregate to market demand.
Monopolistic competition differs from perfect competition in that goods are seen as multidimensional, so that they may have features in common with other goods and yet have other features that make them distinct. Different brands of beer, for instance, are similar and, in that respect, compete with other brands; yet Heineken is unique in its particular formulation, and the Heineken company is the sole purveyor (monopolist) of the brand. Monopolistic competition is the analogue of perfect competition when goods have this multidimensional form: each producer is a monopolist of its own particular good, which nevertheless competes with other related goods. Under perfect competition, any price above the market price would result in no sales; while any price below the market price would capture all market demand. In contrast, under monopolistic competition, consumers may not go for the cheapest good: it may be worth paying more for a Heineken than a Miller Lite -the two brands are imperfect substitutes. Indeed, a 16 consumer may diversify consumption according to the interaction of strength of relative preference and price. So, like a monopolist, the producer must set its price to balance the gains of higher prices to unit revenue against the losses of reduced demand. The assumption of pricetaking is given up in favor of pricesetting, even though the producer remains small relative to the market.
Monopolistic competition can be seen as a less idealized model than perfect competition. If we could give a measure of the differentia among goods, then perfect competition would be the Nowakian limit case in which the differences among goods approached zero.
A Reduction of Macroeconomics to Microeconomics
We now turn to the roles perfect competition and monopolistic competition, among other idealizations, in the reductions of macroeconomics to microeconomics.
Blanchard and Fischer's (1989, ch. 8) model assumes monopolistic competition, but a parallel development could easily be provided for a model using perfect competition.
The first step in their reduction is the idealization that goods are identical in production technology, yet are multidimensional in a way that makes them imperfect substitutes. For example, every type of beer might use the same brewery technology and have the same unit costs of production, even though their recipes differed so that each appealed to some customers more than others. The identicalness of goods on the dimension relevant to production can be seen as a Nowakian idealization, like the analogous assumption of identical firms in the microeconomic model of perfect competition.
Many of the key issues of macroeconomics are captured in the next step.
Individual preferences are given by a utility function of the form: The particular functional forms of equations (5) and (6) · setting the number of producers, goods produced, and consumers to the same number (n); · putting money holdings in the utility function without any attempt to model the manner in which money facilitates trade (although dividing money by a general price level (P) is meant to capture the characteristic feature of money that its effective (or real) quantity depends on what it will buy; · treating the costs of production as expressible only as a disutility associated with the level of production of the consumer/producer's single produced good, rather than directly connecting production to labor or other inputs to production.
Each of these assumptions may be regarded as a pedagogical trick, which helps to make the model more tractable, but which in principle could be relaxed or replaced with a more empirically relevant assumptions in straightforward ways. They do not seem to raise special problems for the project of microfoundations.
The model is closed by treating agents as maximizing (5) A systemic solution can be viewed in two ways. First, as a general equilibrium, the model can be solved for a set of prices that makes the supply and demand for each good and for money equal, taking all agents into account. This is a quintessentially microeconomic solution. The actual derivation rests on symmetry. Since every good is produced using the same production technology and each enters into the individual's utility functions with the same weight and all individuals are identical, each should have the same price in equilibrium. Equation (7) , 20 and for money:
Individual price and output decisions can be derived as part of the solution to the consumers'/producers' optimization problems. In conjunction with the definition of the price level (P), an aggregate supply function relates the price level to the supply of money:
Together the macroeconomic system (10)(12) determine the principal aggregates in the economy. The macroeconomic description has supposedly been reduced to the microeconomic in that the macroeconomic system is derived directly from the microeconomic general equilibrium solution to equations (5)(8). Each of the macroeconomic variables is an aggregation of the microeconomic variables, and the functional forms of the macroeconomic relations are determined by the functional forms and parameters of the microeconomic relationships.
Since idealizing assumptions were involved in the microeconomic model, the reduction is itself idealized. But the model is taken to be a starting point for a model that will concretize a sufficient number of these idealizations until it will serve as a substantive idealization -in this case a model that provides a close enough approximation to the world that it can rationalize actual macroeconomic data.
One example of such improvability, one concretizing step, was the move from the idealization that all the goods are identical, giving a model of perfect competition, to one in which goods are distinct in a manner that supports monopolistic competition. Later in the same lecture, Blanchard and Fischer further concretize the ideal assumption of 21 perfectly flexible prices with assumptions about the costs of price setting that result in models in which prices adjust slowly to shocks to the system (e.g., to a change in M , the money supply).
DOES THE IDEALIZATION WORK?
Blanchard and Fischer's microfoundational reduction involves a number of idealizing steps that are consistent with the goal of achieving substantive idealization. Whether the model is sufficiently concretized on these dimensions is not an a priori conceptual matter, but a matter for empirical investigation and resolution. The reduction nonetheless involves two steps that do raise conceptual difficulties.
The first is reflected in the utility function (equations (5)) that treats the consumption and production decisions as the integrated choice of a single agent. The microreduction views this step as a way of capturing the insight that coordination among agents is essential to macroeconomics. In their formulation, part of the coordination is guaranteed through collapsing the decisions of some firms and consumers (typically different agents in the real economy) into a single optimization problem. While the collapse eliminates any conflict in the choices of particular firmconsumer pairs, the monopolistic competition model at the heart of Blanchard and Fischer's reduction appears to leave room for other conflicting choices by having many such pairs.
Yet there is less here than meets the eye. The model can be viewed as a Nowakian idealization of a Walrasian generalequilibrium model in which producers and consumers are all separate agents. Even at this disaggregated extreme, a genuine coordination problem fails to arise. To see this, consider the perfectly competitive, rather 22 than the monopolistically competitive, case. Here we can push the idealization further and collapse the individual agents into a single, representative agent. The coordination issue is then eliminated, since the economy is governed by a single optimization problem.
This is clearly unattractive and accounts for our dismissing the representativeagent model in the first case. But is the generalequilibrium extreme any better?
Consider the generalequilibrium analogue to the representative agent's optimization problem. Individual agents, solving individual optimization problems provide part of the coordination. They do not, however, provide all of it. In the idealization, the agents are pricetakers, each too small to affect the market on its own.
Somehow their choices must be made mutually consistent. The explicit mechanism is that they face a set of common prices, and those prices are adjusted until excess supplies and demands are eliminated. The explicitly modeled agents set quantities in response to market prices, but who sets market prices? And on the basis of what knowledge?
Economic theorists offer two approaches to these questions. First, sometimes they simply abstract away from the process of price setting and focus only on the equilibrium states, asserting that they exist and that comparisons among equilibria are the salient ones, without considering how an equilibrium is established. Equilibrium is deus ex machina. Nonetheless, even the mathematics of discovering equilibria in formal generalequilibrium models points to the character of the god in the machine. Equilibria are proved by establishing a mapping from vectors of prices (one per good) to vectors of prices, in which the mapping increases some prices for which the demand of the corresponding commodities exceeds the available supply at the original vector of prices.
If the mapping meets certain regularity conditions, then a fixedpoint theorem can be 23 invoked to deduce that there exists a price vector that will be mapped into itself and for which all excess demands (and, therefore, supplies) are zero. The market is said to clear.
The mathematics demonstrates that far from economizing on information, something in the economy must process a great deal of information if it is going to be closely analogous to a generalequilibrium model. The second approach to price setting is to give this god a name. On a smaller scale, we are familiar with auctions, in which the processing of price information is handled in exactly the way envisaged in the pricesto prices mapping. Hence, our god is sometimes referred to explicitly as "the auctioneer."
Other stories are sometimes told, but they are the functional equivalent of the auctioneer.
Here the representative agent is turned into Hobbes's great Leviathan -not the representative agent, but the representative dictator. The representative dictator is not an idealization of the exchange process of macroeconomics, in which the possibility of inconsistent decisions is a live one. Rather -implicitly or explicitly -it is a particular, and particularly unhelpful, concretization, which suggests falsely that the best analogue to a decentralized economy is a command economy along the lines of the Soviet Union or North Korea.
Once again, the case of monopolistic competition, as in Blanchard and Fischer's model, may seem different, since pricesetting is decentralized, prices being a choice variable for the n consumerproducers. Unfortunately, our monotheistic coordinating god or dictator has simply assumed a polytheistic form. The equilibrium value of the aggregate price level in equation (12) is derived from its definition (equation (7)) and the optimal price for each consumerproducer:
24 ( Second, application of equation (13) requires knowledge of the general price level P, and as (7) shows P is constructed through a complex weighting of the individual prices (P j ). In fact, equation (7) is a rather odd aggregating function that bears no obvious relationship to any of the standard formulae for calculating price indices used, for example, by national statistical bureaux. The form of (7) is, in fact, dictated by a macroeconomic consideration: P is defined in just such as way as to make aggregate monetary expenditures on goods equals aggregate monetary incomes
), a condition required by nationalincomeaccounting conventions.
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The general price level is, thus, an irreducible macroeconomic quantity, which cannot be 25 eliminated from the reduction in the sense that individual agents must refer to an aggregate -to the whole -in order to make their individual choices. In fact, its units are not analogous to the units of any individual price. I have previously argued that the general price level is an emergent property of macroeconomic systems and ontologically distinct from, while nonetheless supervenient on, the prices of individual goods (Hoover (1995; 2001b ).
The implicit assumption, then, is that far from succeeding in decentralizing the processing of knowledge and price setting, the microfoundational reduction based on monopolistic competition has put each consumerfirm in a position analogous to the auctioneer, who must know everyone's business. Any objection to the auctioneer in the setting of perfect competition must be multiplied by n in the setting of monopolistic competition. Rather than isolating the essence of the coordination problem, the microreduction dissolves it with a particular assumption that amounts to assuming it away. The situation is much the same as if we offered a figure as an idealized triangle, but neglected to give it three sides.
The second conceptual difficulty of the microreduction concerns aggregation.
Again, it helps to start with perfect competition. The assumption that agents are price takers and small relative to the market is a properly formulated Nowakian formal idealization and may, in practice, prove to be a useful substantive idealization. In contrast, the argument that justifies the representativeagent assumption through an idealization in which general equilibrium stands at one limit and the representativeagent at the other introduces an improper idealization. The representative agent is held to follow the rule of perfect competition, pricetaking, which is justified on the idealizing assumptions that n ® ¥; yet the representative agent is itself an idealization in which n ® 1. The representative agent is -inconsistently -simultaneously the whole market and small relative to market. The problem can be summed up by the question: with whom does the representative agent trade?
Another aspect of the problem can be seen by noting that the acceptable idealization of perfect competition in microeconomics applies to markets for particular goods, while macroeconomics must somehow capture the economy as a whole. This, as we have seen before, suggests that the idealization should start with a general equilibrium system in which there are many different goods. The model would then involve two idealizations. The first lets the number of distinct goods approach a limit at one. The second lets the diversity of types of agents approach a single type, while letting there still be n agents. Aggregation might then appear simple. Aggregate demand would equal n ´ individual demand, and aggregate supply would equal n ´ individual supply. The aggregation would be justified if it yielded a good enough approximation for the purposes at hand. Economics textbooks not infrequently speak of such modeling assumptionsoften referring to the single good as some ubiquitous commodity -e.g., "corn" or "steel."
As we have already noted in Section II, aggregation theory tell us that adding up of individual demands or supplies to a well behaved aggregate demand or supply requires the strong assumption of homotheticity as well as identical goods and agents. Otherwise, as prices, and consequently incomes, change, the aggregates themselves would change and the representative agent's optimization problem and resulting demand and supply functions would no longer take the same form (just scaled up) as a particular agent's optimization problem and resulting functions. The requirement of homotheticity is not a 27 Nowakian idealization. It does not eliminate a substantive factor as inessential by setting it to a limit. Instead, it is a particular concrete assumption upon which the result critically depends. And it is not robust or an attractive prospect for a useful approximation.
Once again, the move toward monopolistic competition does not resolve the problem. Blanchard and Fischer assume identical agents and posit homothetic utility functions. Although they do not assume that goods are identical, the goods are identical in the only ways that matter for aggregation. So, like our previous example of different types of beer, their goods are identical in production requirements, and they enter perfectly symmetrically into utility functions. These strong assumptions trivialize the variety of goods in the realworld, but create the precise conditions needed for aggregation. With perfect competition, we derived the representative agent through an improper idealization. We could rationalize the representative agent through a microreduction that made stronger, particular and nonidealizing assumptions. And even though, Blanchard and Fischer, in this particular model, do not posit a representative agent, we find that they make essentially the same strong, particular, and nonidealizing assumptions in order to provide a microfoundation for the relations of macroeconomic variables. The idealization strategy collapses into the representativeagent strategy.
V. Microfoundations -A Less Than Ideal Reduction
The idea that macroeconomics not only needs microfoundations, but that microeconomics can replace macroeconomics completely is the dominant position in modern economics. No one, however, knows how to derive empirically relevant explanations of observable aggregate relations from the precise individual behaviors that generate them. Instead, the claims to have produced microfoundations are typically fleshed out with representativeagent models in which a single agent treats the aggregates as objects of direct choice, playing by rules that appear to follow the logic and mathematics of microeconomics. It is easy to mock the representative agent. But the defense that is sometimes offered is to provide models that employ a number of idealizing assumptions and appear to either deliver a representativeagent model or an account of unproblematic aggregation.
I accept idealization as a strategy of model building. But legitimate idealization requires that the idealized model capture the essence of the causal structure or underlying mechanisms at work. It is only on that basis that we can trust the model to analyze situations other than the data to hand. And that rationale is precisely what is behind the call for microfoundations in the first place. Models are not, of their nature, cleanly idealized; they must involve particular properties, whose only function is to make them operable or realizable in a manipulable form. Arbitrary concretizations are unavoidable.
A model with utility maximizing agents, must give the utility functions a form. Yet, the trick of using models appropriately is that we should either be able to set aside these particularities in reasoning or show that the results of interest are robust to the range of particular forms that we might reasonably assume. To return to a previous example: a model of a triangle includes particular angles; yet any conclusions that we derive from our model about triangles in general or about some particular triangles in the world which we have no reason to believe are congruent to our model cannot depend critically on those particular angles.
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The essence of the criticism of the common strategies of reducing microeconomics to macroeconomics is that it is based in model building that mixes legitimate idealizations with nonideal, particular modeling assumptions and then relies on those assumptions at critical junctures in providing the derivation of the macroeconomic relationships from microeconomic behaviors.
